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The direction of U.S. farmpolicy changed with the pas-sage of the 2002 farm bill and
the 2000 Agricultural Risk Protection
Act. Previous farm bills, together
with the old crop insurance pro-
gram, had gradually moved the
crops sector toward greater market
orientation, with farmers taking on
more market risk in exchange for
greater planting flexibility. But the
beginning of this decade brought
with it increased protection against
both adverse price movements and
crop losses. These policy changes
were brought about largely at the
behest of farm commodity organiza-
tions, who argued that they needed
increased protection against the va-
garies of weather and market condi-
tions. As we will demonstrate, the
reduction in risk that U.S. crop farm-
ers obtain from crop insurance and
commodity programs is now so dra-
matic that we may have entered a
new era of risk-free farming.
The U.S. proposals for farm
policy reform to the World Trade Or-
ganization (WTO) would, if adopted,
move U.S. farm policy back toward its
previous trajectory of greater market
orientation. However, the WTO talks
have stalled, so it is worthwhile to
take a step back and assess where
U.S. policy currently stands. We use
illustrations of the distribution of re-
turns with and without government
programs to show the impacts of
these programs on farm financial risk
in a single growing season. The as-
sessment begins with a review of the
U.S. farm policy legislation process
and whom it most benefits.
WHAT TYPE OF PRODUCER BENEFITS
FROM U.S. FARM POLICY?
Evidence would suggest that U.S.
farm policy is primarily designed to
meet the interests of commodity as-
sociations. Early in 2001, Larry
Combest, then the chairman of the
House agriculture committee, asked
the National Corn Growers Associa-
tion, the National Cotton Council, the
American Soybean Association, the
Rice Growers Association, the Wheat
Growers Association, the National
Barley Growers Association, and
other associations what farm pro-
gram provisions they wanted to see
in the new farm bill. Chairman
Combest, along with the members of
the House and Senate agriculture
committees, then designed a bill to
meet their wishes. The legislation
passed through Congress and was
signed into law by the president in
May 2002.
These commodity associations
are national associations of farmers.
It seems self-evident that the associa-
tions represent the interests of their
farmer-members. But typically, the
association leaders are chosen from
the most successful farmers, who of-
ten have large, well-financed opera-
tions with lower-than-average costs
and higher-than-average volumes.
Profit incentives in a commodity
system lead crop producers to focus
on low costs and high yields. Thus,
commodity organizations, who are
led by the most successful commod-
ity producers, will tend to support
farm policies that support the kinds
of farm operations that are most suc-
cessful in a commodity system.
MECHANISMS OF SUPPORT AND
FINANCIAL IMPACTS
Here, we focus on the subsidies that
producers of corn, wheat, oilseeds,
rice, cotton, barley, and grain sor-
ghum receive. We examine corn in de-
tail to show how farm programs and
crop insurance affect revenue and we
include wheat and cotton for compari-
son. In addition to farm program pay-
ments, 75 percent of U.S. corn was
insured under the U.S. crop insurance
program in 2003. The most popular
product was a form of revenue insur-
ance whereby the insurance guaran-
tee increases if the harvest price is
greater than the projected harvest
price at planting time. The most popu-
lar coverage level is 75 percent cover-
age (the farmer takes the first 25
percent loss before payments begin).
At the 75 percent coverage level, farm-
ers pay only 45 percent of the actuari-
ally fair premium, which is defined as
the premium that over time would
generate enough total dollars to pay
all insurance claims. Thus farmers re-
ceive a subsidy equal to 55 percent of
the actuarially fair premium.
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Before examining the financial
effects of the various government
programs, let’s look at a representa-
tive farm’s financial picture without
farm programs. At planting time, U.S.
farmers do not know either the price
they will receive for their crops or
what their harvested yield will be.
To capture this uncertainty, we build
a representative farm and repeat a
crop year 5,000 times and record the
outcome. There are 5,000 different
yield and price outcomes. We chose
a representative corn farm in Boone
County, Iowa, with a local expected
farm price set at $2.15/bushels (bu)
and an expected yield of 150 bu per
acre (ac). The standard deviation of
price is set at $0.45/bu and the stan-
dard deviation of yield is 43 bu/ac.
A histogram constructed from
the 5,000 revenue draws is shown in
Figure 1. The histogram shows the
range of possible revenue outcomes
as well as the probability of out-
comes. Variable costs of $150 are
subtracted so that the distribution
shows net revenue. One measure of
the amount of risk that a farmer
faces is the probability that revenue
will not be adequate to cover a cer-
tain level of variable production
costs. A farmer who covers variable
costs has some money left over to
pay off fixed expenses. Figure 1
shows that that average net returns
for this corn farmer are about $163/
ac. There is a very low probability (4
percent) that net returns are nega-
tive. On average, this farmer will
FIGURE 1. HISTOGRAM OF NET REVENUE FOR A REPRESENTATIVE CORN FARM
FIGURE 2. EFFECT OF GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS AND CROP INSURANCE ON RISK
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have approximately $163 left over to
pay all other expenses, including
land, fixed machinery expenses, and
management. For a cash renter, land
costs would increase variable costs
and the entire histogram would shift
to the left, which demonstrates the
increased risk that cash renters face
relative to owner-operators.
Most other U.S. crop farmers
face relatively more risk than this
corn farmer. Iowa corn farmers have
the advantage of highly productive
soils and a natural hedge between
price and yield. When yield is low,
the price is likely to be higher than
expected, thus buffering the nega-
tive impacts of low yields. And low
prices are likely caused by a bumper
crop in Iowa, which helps insulate
Iowa corn farmers from financial
trouble.
IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT
PROGRAMS AND CROP INSURANCE
Now let’s look at the effects of gov-
ernment programs on the financial
risks of this farm. The effects of all
the programs are revealed by com-
paring the distribution of market
plus government receipts to the dis-
tribution shown in Figure 1.
Figure 2 shows the aggregate ef-
fect of these programs on a farmer’s
risk. As can be readily seen, the
amount of risk that this farmer faces
is now significantly reduced and the
expected returns over variable costs
are dramatically increased. Average
net returns increase 46 percent to
about $239/ac with the programs in
place. Perhaps the best way to char-
acterize the effects of the programs
is that with the programs in place
there is now less than a one-in-six
chance that total revenue will fall
below $163/ac, which is the average
revenue without the programs. As
shown in Figure 2, there is no
chance that farmers in Boone
County will not be able to cover
their non-land variable costs. It is in
this sense that we can speculate
that corn farming in Boone County
has become “risk free.”
.
THE PICTURE FOR WHEAT
AND COTTON
Figures 3 and 4 depict pictures of
risk for a wheat farmer in Reno
County, Kansas, and a cotton farmer
in Tallahatchie County, Mississippi.
The pictures for wheat and cotton
are similar to that of corn but there
are some significant differences.
Without government programs,
wheat producers in this Kansas
County have a small probability of
negative returns. Payments and crop
insurance subsidies increase the av-
erage return to wheat farming by 72
percent. This compares to the 46
percent increase for the corn farmer.
The probability that returns over
variable costs fall below $60—which
is the average return with no pro-
grams—is approximately 7 percent.
Thus, if we define risk as the prob-
ability that returns over variable
costs are less than expected returns
under no government programs,
then the programs combined with
crop insurance have essentially re-
duced the risk for wheat farming to
near zero.
The impact from government
programs is even more dramatic for
cotton. Based on an expected local
price of $0.52 per pound (lb), an av-
erage yield of 700 lb/ac, and variable
costs of $325/ac, the expected mar-
ket returns over variable costs for
our Mississippi cotton farmer are
only $39/ac. And the probability that
FIGURE 3. RISK REDUCTIONS FROM GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS FOR WHEAT
FIGURE 4. RISK REDUCTIONS FROM GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS FOR COTTON
Continued on page 10
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market returns will be greater than
variable costs is only 54 percent.
Government programs increase ex-
pected returns by 516 percent to
$200/ac. And the probability that
returns over variable costs fall be-
low expected revenue with no gov-
ernment programs is zero. Thus,
government has taken the risk out
of cotton farming.
U.S. crop producers largely have
obtained what they sought: risk-free
farming courtesy of government
programs. This conclusion implies
nothing about the relative merits of
the various programs or whether
the programs should be modified.
But the programs do create the in-
centive for farmers and landlords to
focus on growing the commodities
Risk Free Farming?
Continued from page 3
targeting of watersheds will be
equally beneficial.
In an attempt to provide some
insight into the potential importance
of targeting funds to various water-
sheds, we employed a water quality
model, the Soil and Water Assess-
ment Tool, to simulate adoption of
conservation tillage (one of the prac-
tices included in the CSP) in the Des
Moines River Watershed and the
Iowa River Watershed. We combined
this model with an economic model
predicting the costs of obtaining
adoption of conservation tillage in
these watersheds based on a pay-
ment program like the CSP. To high-
light the potential consequences of
targeting, we consider two sce-
narios: full adoption of conservation
tillage in the Des Moines River Wa-
tershed with no additional adoption
in the Iowa River Watershed and the
opposite adoption pattern (no new
adoption in the Des Moines River
and full adoption in the Iowa River
Watershed).
Table 1 shows the levels of sedi-
ment (based on a 20-year projected
average) and the estimated costs at
the watershed outlets. As columns 1-
3 indicate, the estimated percentage
reduction in sediment erosion be-
tween the two scenarios is about the
same (about 6 percent), but the
original level of sediment load is
much higher in the Iowa River Wa-
tershed than in the Des Moines River
Watershed. Thus, the total sediment
load reduction is about twice as high
by targeting the Iowa River Water-
shed. This is consistent with column
4, which reports the average sedi-
ment load reduction per acre of land
converted to conservation tillage.
However, the costs of adoption
can vary significantly with targeting
and need to be considered in assess-
ing the consequences of targeting.
The median cost of adopting conser-
vation tillage in the two watersheds
is about 20 percent higher in the
Iowa River Watershed (we estimate
the median costs of adoption to be
$11/acre in the Des Moines River Wa-
tershed). While the total cost of
sediment reduction is higher in the
Iowa River Watershed, the per ton
cost of sediment reduction is signifi-
cantly lower (see columns 5 and 6).
Targeting the Iowa River Watershed
results in a higher overall reduction
in sediment at a lower average cost
per ton than does targeting the Des
Moines River Watershed.
This particular example is only
indicative of the different outcomes
that could occur under various tar-
geting mechanisms. However, the re-
sults of this simple simulation
suggest that by targeting different wa-
tersheds, as proposed in the CSP, the
Natural Resources Conservation Ser-
vice will significantly affect the loca-
tion, degree, and cost effectiveness of
water quality improvements. Details
of this research and other studies fo-
cusing on the consequences of target-
ing and conservation programs can
be found at www.card.iastate.edu/
environment/.◆
Resource and Environmental Policy
staff who contributed to this article are
Hongli Feng, Philip Gassman, Luba
Kurkalova, Silvia Secchi, and
Catherine Kling.
“Targeting” Efficiency in the
Conservation Security Program
Continued from page 5
that are supported by farm pro-
grams. Furthermore, an increased
incentive to plant those hybrids and
varieties that have the highest yields
and lowest costs is what we would
expect from a program designed to
meet the interests of the most effi-
cient producers of commodities. The
programs would look quite different
had the durum wheat and white
corn producers been instrumental in
their design. ◆
